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We live in an era of complex inter-dependence. This renders us vulnerable to 
planetary-scale risks arising from technological change, climate heating, bio-
diversity collapse, and is now – painfully – confronting us with new zoonotic 
diseases that are rocking the foundations of our global order. We are being 
forced to reflect upon our social, economic, and political organisation: what 
and who we value, and how we organise to care for those beings and things 
that bring meaning to our lives. Even more urgently, we have become acutely 
aware that without those willing to work in the caring and provisioning econ-
omies – and during the Covid-19 crisis to put themselves in harm’s way for our 
sake – human civilisation cannot be maintained upon the earth.
A revival of the ideal of democracy as a way of life is therefore timely, and 
Roberto Frega’s proposal to extend the scope of democratic organisation to all 
varieties of associations is welcome. In his formulation, the normative value 
of democracy derives from the opportunities that democratic organisation 
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affords for the moral development, collective learning, and social progress of 
as many people as possible, extending to all those affected by the activities of 
the organisations that shape their interactions. Frega’s wide view of democ-
racy therefore offers us valuable resources for specifying ethically desirable 
forms of organising that can help us to address the sustainability impera-
tive. Such forms of organising will be directed to re-ordering our ways of life, 
including our patterns of interaction with one another and the natural world, 
so as to maintain human civilisation within planetary boundaries. In particu-
lar, Frega’s democratic principles of relational parity, inclusive authority, and 
social involvement mediate the formation of collective capabilities for know-
ing and creating our world as a habitation of mutually inter-dependent beings 
and things, thereby equipping us to accept responsibilities to care and to stew-
ard. By applying Frega’s wide view of democracy to the expanse of organised 
life, we can bring forward resources for a total learning system that is grounded 
in a consciousness of our shared fate – a consciousness that is foundational for 
planet-spanning social cooperation.
Democratic political theory has not had much to say about the status of 
organisations, or the associational ecosystems of which they are a part. Despite 
notable exceptions such as Paul Hirst’s Associative Democracy, organisations 
have been marginalised as moral-free sites or political voids that, although 
externally regulated by political institutions, are not conducive to emancipa-
tory political action – for example, through the democratic organisation of 
work (Hirst, 2007). This neglect has recently been remedied by theorists who 
are reconsidering the nature of the firm, of work, and of human organising 
in general (see, for example, Anderson (2017), Herzog (2017, 2018), Yeoman 
(2020), Singer (2018), Ciepley (2013)). When brought together with Frega’s wide 
view of democracy theory, these scholars provide tools for developing a more 
complete political theory of democratically organised associational life. In my 
own work (see Yeoman, 2020), I characterise all organisations – whether or 
not they are democratically organised – as associational ensembles of beings 
and things towards which we have responsibilities of care. Often, these beings 
and things are of independent moral significance, and we attach ourselves to 
them to the extent that they give us a sense that our lives are worth living, or 
are meaningful (Yeoman, 2014a; 2014b). With this in mind, I argue that one of 
the purposes of democratically organised associational life is to create a total 
learning system that sensitises people to their responsibilities to look after the 
valuable beings and things that we orchestrate into associational ecosystems, 
and with which our lives are intertwined. Creating assemblages under an ethic 
of care means bringing objects into focus as a matter of common concern – a 
process in which all those who are affected by how well the object is doing 
have an interest. Pettit (2014) describes collective entities as ‘a group whose 
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members combine to act within group roles in such a way that the group as 
a whole simulates or mimics an individual agent’ (p. 1641), where collective 
agency is maintained by the actions of members as ‘attempts by the group to 
satisfy its purposes’. When democratically organised, collective entities are 
problem-solving devices for people to pursue purposes that matter to them, 
including especially those related to caring for the valuable beings and things 
that give meaning to their lives. This problem-solving function extends to net-
works of heterogenous entities, or the associational ecosystems constituted 
by interconnected and interacting beings and things that make technological 
human civilisation possible.
Frega’s theory helps us formulate the developmental possibilities afforded 
by democratically organised problem-solving. I focus on one aspect of Frega’s 
work – his use of Hannah Arendt (1958) and Mary Parker Follett (1918 [1998]) 
in the construction of collective power. I join Arendt and Follett with Simone 
Weil, one of the few philosophers of work with direct experience of factory life. 
I make use of Weil’s concept of attention to highlight some neglected aspects of 
power that are relevant to enhancing Frega’s project. In Frega’s theory of demo-
cratic collective action (p. 161), political activation occurs within the specifica-
tion and pursuit of collectively defined goals. He draws from Follett’s processual 
and interactional perspective upon political action to identify group activity 
as ‘an embedded dimension of social life’ (p. 166). Follett creates publics out of 
group-based politics through the application of a ‘basic grammar of democratic 
group activation’ (p. 162) that includes an evaluation of ‘consequences, conflict, 
interests, means-end rationality, and organizational constraints’ (p. 162). For 
Follett, the purpose of democratic group process is integrative problem-solving 
where difference-generating social interaction produces inclusive, dynamic, 
and creative group life: ‘the problem of democracy is how to make our daily life 
creative’ (p. 171) and ‘the core of the group process is creating’ (p. 173). Acting 
as a group means: firstly, respecting deliberative principles of common reason-
ing, and secondly, orienting group activity towards ‘the cooperative formulation 
and achievement of a common goal’ (p. 172). The democratic group life is thus 
a collaborative inquiry that applies difference-making and truth-seeking to the 
search for means and ends which constitute normatively viable responses to 
contentious and intractable problems. Consistent with Frega’s democratic prin-
ciples, the capacity of the group to act is augmented by including – under rela-
tional conditions of equality and mutual respect – as many people as possible in 
crafting solutions to shared problems.
Group life is maintained when the group has the ability to create collec-
tive power (p.319). In Arendt’s theory of communicative power, power is the 
‘power to begin’, ‘to act in concert’, where practices of ‘binding and promis-
ing, combining and covenanting are the means by which power is kept in 
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existence’ (Arendt, in Frega, p. 323). Collective power is produced when people 
act together, and as a property of the group endures only so long as the group 
endures. Arendt is sceptical of using bureaucratic organisation to extend the 
duration of collective power. She sees bureaucracy as a form of tyranny that 
eliminates responsible agency. By contrast, Follett’s concept of coactive power, 
or power-with (p. 324) – which privileges integration over coercion and bar-
gaining in decision-making – is manifested and maintained within an insti-
tutional infrastructure: ‘rather than power to begin, power with is the power 
to create, to innovate in the face of uncertainty and of the problems which a 
social unity – not matter which – has to face’ (p. 326). For Follett, the site of 
action is not politics as a realm unsullied by bureaucratic administration, but 
rather resides in the processes of human interaction that emerge in organi-
sations and associations, and between ‘individuals who submit to a common 
destiny and must act together’ (p. 325). Frega summarises:
‘[…] whereas for Arendt communicative power can be grasped only 
against the background of the irreducible alterity of political action and 
everyday praxis, for Follett power with exists only when self-government 
is combined with successful functional differentiation, which means 
when authority and responsibility are distributed according to capaci-
ties’ (p. 325).
The purpose of collective power is to help us look after beings and things that 
matter to us. This is because valuable beings and things that make our lives 
worth living often present us with problems which can be dealt with only 
through associational organising. Solving such problems invariably involves 
practical reasoning regarding what these objects mean to us (‘ends’), and how 
they can be cared for (‘means’). Arendt and Follett, supplemented by Weil’s 
insights regarding the practice of attention, offer resources for means/ends 
practical reasoning in group life that is directed towards caring for objects of 
common concern. A neglected aspect of practical reasoning is our need for 
meaning in life and work, and the role that the moral value of meaningful-
ness plays in motivating collective action (Yeoman, 2020). We reason together 
regarding what we ought to do to take care of those beings and things that 
possess independent moral significance and to which we are emotionally 
attached and involved (Yeoman, 2014a; cf. Wolf, 2010). Our vulnerability to 
harms that may be done to these being and things stimulates collective action, 
often resulting in enduring forms of organisation. Wallace (2006) identifies a 
mode of reasoning that he calls ‘eudaimonistic reflection’, which involves ask-
ing ‘whether engaging in these pursuits is worthwhile, something that makes 
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our own lives choice-worthy as human lives’ (p. 395). Wolf (2010) describes 
meaningfulness as a moral value distinct from utility or virtue that combines 
the objective/ethical-normative and subjective/cognitive-emotional dimen-
sions. In collective deliberation regarding means and ends, participants in 
group life derive objective and subjective dimensions of meaningfulness from 
people, projects, and other things, and incorporate these dimensions into col-
lective practical reasoning concerning what they ought to do. Practical reason-
ing focussed upon the welfare of valuable beings and things is enhanced when 
groups adopt practices of attention to surface and interpret the meanings 
implicated in objects of shared concern, and to carry ethically viable meanings 
forward into collective understanding and knowledge building.
Making the object visible as a matter of common concern, so that groups 
can create collective purposes directed at caring for that object, entails inter-
active processes of meaning-making. The multiple, and often conflicting, 
perspectives afforded by democratic organisation reveals objects as plural 
entities, enmeshed in relational webs, and constituted by meanings. Under 
the relational conditions provided by Frega’s three principles, these meanings 
can be translated into the understanding and knowledge needed for collec-
tive learning. Arendt (1954) connects meaning-making to the understand-
ing and knowledge needed for means/ends reasoning in collective action: 
‘understanding is based on knowledge and knowledge cannot proceed with-
out a preliminary, inarticulate understanding’ (Arendt, 1954: p. 310). When 
faced with perplexing situations, inclusive participation in group life, under 
conditions of mutual respect and equal interactive status and power, can 
help people use meaning-making to bridge knowledge and understanding. 
In the absence of meaning-making, there are ‘only events and no mean-
ings’ (Hansen, 2004: 7), and life becomes ‘dumb, preposterous, destructive’ 
(Dewey, 1922: 280). Frega’s three principles specify what structure action 
contexts need to have if interactions between self, others, and objects are 
to generate productive cycles of meaning, knowledge, and understanding. 
In problematic situations, these mediated interactions of meaning-making 
are a source of interpretive differences that outline the horizon of shared 
understanding. By incorporating the value of meaningfulness into practi-
cal reasoning, groups can expand this preliminary understanding to enrich 
knowledge with diverse meanings (Arendt, 1954: p. 311); evaluate judgments 
and assumptions; and ‘prepare a new resourcefulness of the human mind 
and heart’ (ibid: p. 310).
By investigating the meanings implicated in problematic situations, groups 
construct the understanding and knowledge they need to sustain what they 
value, and to make the world into a home where they can dwell together with 
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the beings and things that matter to them: ‘For you will have developed a frame 
of mind which gives meaning to things that happen; and to find a meaning, to 
understand along with others, is always a contentment, an enjoyment’ (Dewey, 
1922: p. 279). Meanings are generative of purpose as the ends of collective 
organising. Follett links meanings to purposing in a processual view of ends, 
such that ‘ends and meanings truly and literally make each other’ (Follett, 1919: 
p. 579). Follett (1949) argues that participants in group life create and recre-
ate purpose through integrative social processes that engage all those partic-
ipating in collective action around a matter of shared concern. She critiques 
‘teleological psychology’ (p. 33) for fixing purposes prior to action, thereby 
submitting relational processes to pre-determined ends: ‘no more fatally disas-
trous conception has ever dominated us than the conception of static ends’ (p. 
33). There are no already extant purposes waiting to be discovered, since ‘pur-
pose is not ‘preexistent, but involved in the unifying act which is the life pro-
cess. It is man’s part to create purpose and to actualize it’ (Follett, 1919: p. 578).
Practices of attention help people form collective perceptions of diverse 
meaning-sources – cultural, historical, economic, moral, and more. When 
filtered through the value of meaningfulness, these meaning-sources pro-
vide symbolic cognitive-emotional material for means/ends reasoning, and 
hence the co-creation of purposes. McGilchrist (2019) describes attention as a 
dynamic, world-forming cognitive function, such that ‘attention changes what 
kind of thing comes into being for us, in that way it changes the world’ (p. 
28). This capacity can be augmented by Weil’s concept of attention, for whom 
attention is a feature of moral agency that has potential to actualise human 
freedom in the midst of acting together. Although not explicitly connected to 
her thoughts on collective action, Weil’s concept of attention has much to offer 
a theory of democratically organised group life. For Weil, free action lies in the 
continual re-creation of the self through transformative processes of action. 
She argues that collective reasoning and planning make problems susceptible 
to human action, and that by constantly turning constraints into actionable 
obstacles, the individual continually re-constitutes himself: ‘A completely free 
life would be one wherein all real difficulties presented themselves as kinds of 
problems, wherein all successes were as solutions carried into action’ (Weil, 
1955 [2001]: p. 68; see also Weil (1946 [1977]). With this in mind, Weil finds 
emancipatory moments of collective agency that are potent with possibilities 
for individual development even within intensively divided factory work:
‘…a team of workers on a production-line under the eye of a foreman is 
a sorry spectacle, whereas it is a fine sight to see a handful of workmen 
in the building trade, checked by some difficulty, ponder the problem 
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each for himself, make various suggestions for dealing with it, and then 
apply unanimously the method conceived by one of them, who may 
or may not have any official authority over the remainder. At such mo-
ments the image of a free society appears almost in its purity’ (weil, 
1955 [2001]: p. 95).
Weil describes attention upon the object as a suspension (but not an absence) 
of thought that leaves our minds detached and ready to be influenced by the 
object. As our awareness opens out to the object, we hold onto our diverse but 
provisional knowledge about the object lightly, thereby making ourselves will-
ing to have that knowledge amended.
‘[…] holding in our minds, within reach of this thought, but on a lower 
level and not in contact with it, the diverse knowledge we have acquired 
which we are forced to make use of. Our thought should be in relation to 
all particular and already formulated thoughts, as a man on a mountain 
who, as he looks forward, sees also below him, without actually looking 
at them, a great many forests and plains. Above all our thought should 
be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its naked 
truth the object that is to penetrate it.’ (weil, 1966 [2010]).
Murdoch describes Weil’s attention as ‘a just and loving gaze directed upon 
an individual reality’ (in Cordner, 2016: p. 199). As a moral ability, attention 
is a pathway for moral learning: ‘moral change comes from an attention to 
the world […] through an increased sense of reality, primarily of people, but 
also of other things’ (Murdoch, in Cordner, 2016: p.206). Weil’s concept of 
attention involves receptiveness to different ways by which the object of 
attention reveals itself. So, not merely receiving the object by weighing and 
judging at a distance, but being influenced by seeing: ‘attention as a kind 
of receptiveness, and as accompanying, being present at or to, waiting on, 
serving, answering to’ (Cordner, 2016: p. 208). Rather than hiding oneself 
from the other, attention involves letting oneself be seen. Mutual visibility 
to one another entails mutual vulnerability to be changed by that seeing. By 
fostering receptivity to other beings and things, and discovering that they 
have an independent reality, we are formed and changed by our apprecia-
tion and acknowledgement of another’s distinct existence. When adopted in 
democratically organised group life, attention fosters processes of knowing 
that extend the possibility of self-transformation through a willingness to be 
shaped by the object. This kind of attention involves orientations of ‘wait-
ing’, rather than ‘searching’, through which we forge an understanding of the 
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object with our ‘whole selves’. This is an indirect method of knowing the 
object which avoids excessive or dysfunctional attachment that may work 
against the welfare of the object (and ourselves). Attention is particularly 
important when caring for others – Weil (1966 [2010]) says that giving atten-
tion to someone who is suffering is ‘a very rare and difficult thing; it is almost 
a miracle’ (p. 36). She continues:
‘The love of our neighbour in all its fullness simply means being able to 
say to him: ‘What are you going through?’ It is a recognition that the suf-
ferer exists, not only as a unit in a collection, or a specimen from the 
social category labeled ‘unfortunate’, but as a man, exactly like us, who 
was one day stamped with a special mark by affliction. For this reason it 
is enough, but it is indispensable, to know how to look at him in a certain 
way. […] This way of looking is first of all attentive. The soul empties itself 
of all its own contents in order to receive into itself the being it is looking 
at, just as he is, in all his truth. (weil, 1966 [2010]: p. 36)
Weil says that attention entails a process of de-creation: the destruction of the 
‘I’, or the ego which focusses attention solely upon itself. Freeman (2015), how-
ever, is concerned that thinking of attention this way entails self-annihilation. 
He interprets attention as a ‘holding-in-abeyance’ (p. 165) that fosters ‘a kind of 
full emptiness’ (p. 165), or a sensitive perception of the separateness and differ-
ence of the object, whilst recognising mutual connectedness. In other words, 
attention operates in the gap between separation and joining. Attention helps 
relate us to valuable beings and things through interactions of simultane-
ous alienation and reconciliation that provide space for the exploration of 
meanings. Moreover, attention stimulates generosity and capaciousness in 
meaning-making when collective processes of meaning-making are structured 
by Frega’s three democratic principles of interaction. Openness to diversity 
and difference yields ethically viable meanings that can be carried forward 
into shared understanding, collective knowledge building, and joint learning.
When attention is practised in group life that is organised by Frega’s three 
principles, participants are more equipped to service one another with acts 
of caring concern: ‘love is the deep knowledge of the individual’ and ‘a deep-
ening process […] an altering and complicating process’ (Murdoch, 2001: p. 
425). Millgram describes the ability to see things and beings with attentive 
love as ‘an arresting awareness of value in a person that makes one really see 
him or her’ (in Cordner, 2016: p. 202). How to re-conceive the value of beings 
and things is an urgent undertaking for our times. Putting attention to work 
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upon the means/ends needed to care for valuable beings and things sensitises 
groups to what is of value, and ‘builds up structures of value around about 
us’ (Murdoch, 2001: p. 429). A group capability for attention in democratically 
organised collective action stimulates what Murdoch describes as descriptive- 
normative talk in the presence of the common object. Democratic pathways 
allow such talk, in the form of narratives, ideas, words and concepts, to flow 
through the group life of the organisation, as well as between the organisation 
and other collective entities in its associational ecosystem: ‘words are the most 
subtle symbols which we possess and our human fabric depends upon them. 
The living and radical nature of language is something we forget at our peril’ 
(Murdoch, 2001, p. 427). Words are bearers of meanings that contribute to life 
and work meaning. Indeed, Repp (2018) argues that a meaningful life depends 
upon a life rich in sign meaning.
Practising attention in collective practical reasoning surfaces and augments 
meanings, making them available for co-creating understanding and knowl-
edge needed to look after objects for the sake of which collective power exists. 
But such meaning-talk requires other modes of power in addition to collec-
tive power. Cordner (2016) is concerned that attention facilitates exploitative 
appropriation of the object by the efficient acquisition of critical knowledge – 
grasping the object as an act of possession, or knowing the object so as to more 
efficiently pursue exploitation of the object. Allen (1998) describes power as 
‘the ability of a collectivity to act together for the attainment of a common or 
shared end or series of ends’, where power-with is ‘a collective ability based 
in receptivity and reciprocity that characterize relations among members of 
the collective’. But even coactive power can act against the interests of some 
participants who are vulnerable exploitation by failing to clear our ‘distorted 
vision’ (Murdoch, 2001: p. 429). Along with co-active power, a different kind 
of power is needed: one that enables us to incorporate objects into collective 
action using ways of knowing and seeing that put us in proper relation to 
those objects. This power is a form of mutual influencing – neither coactive 
nor coercive – but is rather the power to be open to the influence of another, as 
a kind of moral capacity that renders us willing to be changed by that encoun-
ter (Loomer, 1976). In Frega’s approach to collective power, Arendt’s coactive 
power – otherwise fleeting and episodic – endures within Follett’s democrati-
cally organised self-governance. However, the mutual vulnerabilities involved 
in the practice of attention requires this other kind of power – a form of power 
as opening up rather than closing down, of making oneself available to become 
something different as a result of encountering the object. Loomer (1976) iden-
tifies this power with mutual influence, or a moral capacity of attending to, a 
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readiness or preparedness to not just shape, but also to be shaped by the other, 
or those objects that are permanently contestable, and only temporarily fixed. 
This form of relational power, when organised under the principles of the wide 
view of democracy, facilitates the practice of attention in group life.
Relational power as mutual influencing underpins public arenas inside – 
and between – all kinds of associations, whether these are private, public, or 
civic. Frega argues that Arendt’s conception of the public sphere confines com-
municative acts within its boundaries, and therefore a broadening and plural-
ising of the public sphere is required. Given this, we should foster ‘a plurality 
of heterogeneous public arenas […] where individual and collective actors 
gather and struggle around a plurality of issues, only a fraction of which can 
be accounted for in terms of their communicative power’ (p.333). We can use 
Frega’s principles of democratic organisation to establish public arenas within 
and between the organisations that make up our associational life, whilst at 
the same time recognising that organisations are many worlds, or ensembles 
of valuable beings and things. For Arendt (1958), the world has a dual objec-
tive and inter-subjective character: firstly, the ‘objective public in-between’ 
of things that connect and separate human beings, and secondly, the inter-
subjective web of relationships that encompasses ‘innumerable perspectives’ 
(Breen, 2009: p. 142). We can surface and augment the meanings invested in 
these congregations of beings and things through the normative-descriptive 
talk that comes with the practice of attention. By such means, we grow into 
understanding how we are interdependent with other beings and things, and 
how we are made vulnerability by changes to their condition. The poet, Mary 
Oliver, says ‘to pay attention, this is our endless and proper work’. In complex 
organisational ecosystems, such as supply chains, multi-stakeholder initia-
tives, cites and city regions, sectors and associational ensembles of all kinds, 
meaning-rich talk is often facilitated by boundary workers, who have special 
responsibility for binding together overlapping and inter-connected worlds. 
Many people now find themselves engaged in such boundary work, stitch-
ing public arenas into an associational fabric that has become planet-span-
ning. Consequently, pluralised action contexts are starting to emerge, through 
which people can collectively discharge their responsibilities to care for val-
uable beings and things. When supplemented by the practice of attention, 
Frega’s principles for democratic associational life ensure such action contexts 
embody patterns of interaction between beings and things that are responsive 
to how all participants are affected by a world undergoing radical change.
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